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JORDAN-SYRIA-EGYPT: Amman appears close to resuming diplomatic relations with Cairo and Damascus in a show of "Arab unity."

Six weeks after his unsuccessful bid to persuade the Egyptians and Syrians to re-establish ties with Jordan, King Husayn's special envoy, Abd al-Munim Rifai, accompanied by President Sadat's troubleshooter, Hasan Sabri al-Khuli, last week had new and apparently more productive talks in Cairo, Amman, and Damascus.

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Jordanian and Egyptian press have both been trumpeting a return to normal relations soon.

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Sadat probably wishes to bring Jordan at least nominally back into the fold as part of his current diplomatic maneuvering to isolate the US and Israel. Husayn would be willing to go along with a symbolic return to the Arab fold so long as he retained absolute control over his own armed forces and did not have to readmit the fedayeen or any other Arab forces to Jordan. The King has been seeking a reconciliation with Cairo and Damascus largely in the hope that this would persuade the Kuwaitis to resume their \$40-46 million annual subsidy to Amman.

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CHILE: The major results of the military's return to the cabinet last week have been to buy President Allende time and to confuse the political situation further.

General reaction in the armed forces--even among officers who disapprove the move--appears to be one of allegiance to the four service commanders as they assume their difficult tasks as cabinet ministers. Those officers who have been plotting to oust the government, and the rightists who have been pressuring them to get on with the job, now seem at once more desperate to act and more apprehensive of failure. The naval officer corps, generally accepted as the focal point of coup sentiment, reportedly is shaken by evidence of extensive leftist penetration of navy ranks.

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[redacted] announcement that the party backs the continuing truckers' strike in defiance of the government is at odds with indications that other elements in the PDC are ready to explore some compromise with the government.

Leftist allegations that a "soft coup" has occurred and that Allende has made important concessions to the military and to the Christian Democrats seem to be without foundation. Rather than meeting the conditions laid down by the military last month for re-entry into the cabinet, Allende appears to have maneuvered the reluctant air force and navy commanders into joining his "cabinet of national security." Military officers are now saddled with restoring order and reopening supply lines, but thus far have been denied the authority, especially over Marxist subordinates, to carry out this responsibility. For example, while military officers have been appointed for each province to put an end [redacted]

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[to the truckers' strike, they have not been given emergency powers. The radical Socialist under-secretary of transportation has, in fact, sabotaged military efforts to end the truck strike. Despite the complaints by leftist extremists of excessive concessions by the government, it is significant that they have not broken with the government over this issue.]

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1&3 BANGLADESH: Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman may show enough flexibility on the key issue of war crimes trials to permit further headway in the Indo-Pakistani negotiations set to resume on 18 August in New Delhi.

3 Last month, India and Pakistan agreed to a formula under which Bengalees in Pakistan and Pakistani prisoners of war held in India would be repatriated immediately. Excluded would be 195 Pakistanis charged with war crimes and 203 Bengalees accused of treason whose fate would be decided later. The Pakistanis indicated that if Mujib agreed to the formula, they would end their opposition to Bangladesh's admission to the UN.

2 *1&3* The Indians apparently were unable to win Mujib's acceptance during discussions at the Commonwealth Conference in Ottawa last week, but P. N. Haksar, who led the Indian delegation at the Indo-Pakistani talks last month, is to arrive in Dacca today for another try. Mujib probably will not compromise on the principle of holding trials eventually, but he may be willing to delay the trials so long as he believes his image at home will not be damaged.

--According to Bengalee officials, the government is having difficulty preparing cases, and it is doubtful that convictions could be obtained at this time.

1&3 --Mujib does not want to appear to be the sole obstacle to a South Asian settlement at the nonaligned conference in Algiers next month.

--Early trials would preclude any chance of gaining UN membership this fall and establishing relations with Peking.

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3 Mujib has shown flexibility on the timing of trials in the past. Despite numerous announcements by government officials that trials would be held shortly, delays have consistently occurred; in late 1 July, Mujib refused to set a specific date.

1 2 3 The trials have recently become a domestic political issue again in Bangladesh, and Mujib will gauge public opinion carefully before making a decision. He does not appear to be under significant pressure to hold trials soon, but both his deep personal commitment and public actions by his government--such as the passage of legislation authorizing the trials--limit his maneuverability. [redacted]

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SYRIA-LEBANON: Ministerial negotiations concerning the reopening of the border between the two countries ended Saturday with a decision to submit the results to higher levels. The Syrian foreign minister's statement that the talks were "positive" has increased Lebanese optimism.

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Syria closed the border in May in an attempt to force the Lebanese Government to come to terms with the fedayeen. The Syrian move was also intended to maintain the fedayeen presence in Lebanon--and keep them out of Syria--and to serve Syria's political interests inside Lebanon.

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No details of the talks have been revealed, but Lebanese newspapers allege that Syrian conditions for the reopening included:

--the application of the Lebanese social security system to Syrians working in Lebanon and an end to their alleged ill-treatment;

--agreement by the Lebanese Government to expel Syrian nationals hostile to the Asad regime who now reside in Lebanon;

--the arrest of some anti-Syrian Baathists in Lebanon.

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It is unlikely that Lebanon's tough-minded President Franjiyah would accede to all of the demands. Syria may have dropped some of its more objectionable conditions in return for token concessions by the Lebanese. Tony Franjiyah, son of the Lebanese President and a cabinet minister in his own right, was received by Asad in Damascus on Saturday and conveyed his father's good wishes. The gesture to Asad may have contributed to the progress apparently achieved in the border talks later that night.

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AUSTRALIA: Canberra is interested in joining forces with world producers of raw materials to gain greater control over supplies and prices. Earlier this year, the Australian and Brazilian ministers for minerals discussed ways in which iron ore producers could cooperate to improve their marketing strength. During talks with President Echeverria of Mexico last month, Prime Minister Whitlam proposed cooperation among major exporters of all raw materials. While it is doubtful that exporting countries will combine to try to control the markets for a wide range of raw materials, Australia and Brazil may attempt to interest other exporters in a joint effort to restrict exports of iron ore if prices decline. Together the two countries account for nearly 30 percent of world iron ore exports.

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Iran-Vietnam: The PRG has announced that Iran is acceptable as a replacement for Canada on the ICCS. A PRG spokesman said that the US had formally proposed the move to the North Vietnamese, who recently established relations with Iran, and that the PRG had relayed its approval to the US via Hanoi.

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USSR - South Korea: The USSR has granted permission to a South Korean sports troupe to participate in the Universiad games in Moscow next week. This is the first time the Russians have allowed a group of South Koreans to enter the Soviet Union, and it is certain to draw considerable publicity.

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